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war, including several at the Jutland battle, the Germans have not so far admitted that any were sunk, except the pre-dreadnought battleship *Pommern*, and the battle cruiser *Lutzow*". . . while, "on the other hand, British capital ships, mined or torpedoed, rarely survived". He also states that the Germans had expended more on gunnery and torpedo practices; "that German submarines possessed a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably greater than those of our submarines"; that "the Germans possessed an excellent practice ground in Kiel Bay, with every appliance for carrying out gunnery exercises". . . and that "We were not in so fortunate a position. There had been no recent opportunity for carrying out gunnery and torpedo exercises and practices"; and he indicates a number of reasons for suspecting not only that the skill of the Germans at gunnery and torpedo practices was greater than that of the British, but that the torpedoes themselves were better. He also shows that the optical devices of the Germans for finding the range, etc., were more scientific and practical. In speaking of the night action, one sentence reads,

The use of star shell, at that time unfamiliar to us, was of the greatest use to them in locating our destroyers without revealing their own positions; and, secondly, their searchlights were not only more powerful (much more so than ours), but their method of controlling them and bringing guns and searchlights rapidly on to any vessel sighted was excellent. It also appeared that some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of their secondary armament.

A brief review like this is inadequate to the task of giving more than the gist of Jellicoe's book. To me the gist is the proof that, despite the fact that the battle of Jutland was a victory for the British, the German navy was the better, and was vanquished merely because it was the smaller.

A fact like this, super-important as it is to us, is super-important only in so far as it may lead us to see the reason why Germany secured a better navy than Great Britain. The reason, of course, is that Germany followed the better system (the general staff system) whereby the planning for the whole conduct of the navy was in the hands—and brains—of experts specially trained for the task.

Great Britain has now virtually adopted this system.

BRADLEY A. FISKE.

*Der Weltkrieg in seiner Einwirkung auf das Deutsche Volk.* Herausgegeben von MAX SCHWARTE. (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer. 1918. Pp. viii, 513.)

THE spirit of the work is that of March, 1918, when Germany still appeared "militarily in an unconquerable position on land and sea" (p. 98). The editor and his twenty-five collaborators include corps and divisional commanders, vice-admirals, professors, *Oberbürgermeister*, *Re-*

*gierungsräte*, and *Landräte*, all of them *Kaisertreue* of Conservative or National Liberal faith. The military and political chapters bear the names of men like Freytag-Loringhoven, Schiemann, and Blankenburg, to whom August 1, 1914, is a "landmark of stupendous grandeur" in the rise of the German people; and even the article on the "army of workers at home" is not from the pen of a Socialist, but from that of the Christian Socialist Johann Giesberts. Nevertheless, there are apparent here and there much war-weariness and premonitions of political disaster when peace shall bring the soldiers home, while not a few passages sound like whistling for courage.

The work opens with an interesting discussion by the Heidelberg theologian Ernst Troeltsch of the character of the war, which he develops out of a "European family struggle", resulting from the new arrangement of 1860-1870, into a world-conflict, whose "planetary character" he ascribes to the nationalization of economic forces (*Durchstaatlichung der Wirtschaft*) which has grown out of national customs policies and the intense rivalry for the remaining sources of raw materials. Following a series of articles reviewing the military lessons derived from trench warfare and the use of high-power artillery and from the mobilization of man-power at home, a third section traces the political effects of the struggle in an advance toward liberalism in parliamentary life and in the reshaping of international relations. A fourth series of papers then outlines the war-time organization of agriculture, manufacturing, trade, and finance, with a résumé of the various devices to evade the blockade in the struggle to replace the twenty-five per cent. of food-stuffs, which was Germany's pre-war importation, and the fight of the scientists for raw materials through the extraction of nitrogen from the air, the substitution of nettles for cotton, of the various products of the marsh "cat-tail" (*typha*) for jute, of iron and zinc for copper, and half a hundred other substitutes and replacements. Other chapters picture in sombre colors the moral and physical hardships of women and their mass invasion of industry, and still others describe, quite superficially, the influence of the war on public health, on legal administration, religion, art, and letters.

In the nature of things, the work offers little that is new in detail, but much that is enlightening in the point of view. Such, for instance, is Blankenburg's account of the struggle of old liberalism, in the Reichstag and without, against the forces which were undermining the monarchy. Schiemann's well-supported inference that in May and June, 1915, Sweden was close to joining the Central Powers (p. 143) is of interest, as is his brutal rejection of Bethmann-Hollweg's "confession of sin" with regard to Belgium. The value of the book lies in the collective impression it makes and the composite picture it offers of Germany on the eve of the last great offensive. In 500 pages, now superficially, now with painstaking care, here with rhetorical pathos and there in the hard accents of the economist and statistician, there unfold before

us all of the material and moral forces of a nation at bay and of a political system on trial for its life—the technical accomplishment of the soldier, the hasty exploitation of limited raw materials by the chemist and the physicist, the drab misery of the working classes, the patient, unrewarded labor of women. The resultant impression is that of intense popular energy, still concentrated and co-ordinated under the old leadership.

ROBERT H. FIFE, jr.

*German Social Democracy during the War.* By EDWYN BEVAN.  
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1919. Pp. x, 280.  
\$2.50.)

MR. BEVAN, writing in the spring of 1918, had access, as an Englishman, to files of German newspapers and to many significant Socialist pamphlets which at that time were denied to most American scholars by the British military censors. Consequently he was enabled to do what could not be done on this side of the water—to prepare from primary sources a history of German Social Democracy during the war. This he has done thoroughly, dispassionately, and interestingly, from the August days of 1914 to the dismissal of Michaelis in October, 1917.

The story is not surprising to anyone familiar with the general tendencies of the Social Democratic party in Germany on the eve of the Great War. or with the various schools of thought among its leading members. The German Socialists had fully prepared themselves to be duped by the Kaiser's government, and when the Great War actually broke they succumbed easily and at first unanimously. Germany must protect herself, they said, against the oncoming savage Russians; and in ignorance of the true situation in Belgium they rallied to the banners of the Hohenzollerns, the Junkers, and the bourgeoisie, proclaimed that Germany was fighting a war of pure self-defense such as was sanctioned by Socialist principles, and on August 4, 1914, voted as a unit the first war-credits demanded by Bethmann-Hollweg. Subsequently they were disillusioned, but the process was slow and halting. It took time for members to convince themselves, by a study of the diplomatic correspondence and the crafty conduct of the government, that Germany and Austria were the aggressors; it required real courage, moreover, to act upon such a conviction in the midst of the war-psychology of the whole German people and in the face of the traditional solidarity and discipline of their own party. With the exception of Liebknecht, who voted against the second war-credits in December, 1914, and Rühle, who joined Liebknecht in March, 1915, the Reichstag dissenters long confined their opposition to the party caucus; on the floor of the Reichstag they either voted with the majority or absented themselves when votes were taken. It was not until December, 1915, that other votes were actually cast against war-credits, and not until March, 1916, that Haase read a "minority